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ABSTRACT

This thesis probes the sharply rising income inequality in reform-era China under
the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) authoritarian regime. Accepting the premise that
economic transition inevitably leads to the income inequality, my special focus in this
thesis is to demonstrate how political factors contribute to the worsening income
inequality in China.
This study shows that the skewed power structure generates the income inequality.
I explore three factors pertaining to the political regime that lead to the widening income
inequality in reform-era China, which are: first, the nature of Chinese political system,
which includes: the CCP’s dominant position in party-state China; the cadre system – an
effective way for the CCP’s control over Chinese society; the imbalanced power
distribution among the legislative, executive, and judicial agencies. Second, the
relationship between power abuse (including corruption) and income inequality, which
includes: bureaucratic system, guanbenwei, guanxi, and their influences on power abuse;
power abuse and corruption in the reform era. Third, the political causes of Chinese
social stratification, which includes: Chinese social stratification evolution; lacking of
workers’ union and the unequal treatment between cadres and workers when facing the
SOEs’ reform; dual urban-rural system and the plight of the rural Chinese.
In the part of conclusion, I make a comparative study of income inequality
between China and the transitional societies, i.e., the post-Communist countries. This
study shows that the old Communist regimes account for the dramatically rising income
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inequalities, which reinforce my argument that the CCP’s authoritarian regime is
responsible for the sharp income inequalities in the reform era.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

China has experienced rapid and virtually uninterrupted growth and has a record of a
staggering rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, averaging more than 9 percent
during the last two decades.1 Under the serious negative influence of SARS in 2003,
China’s GDP continued the momentum at 9.1%. 2 China has lifted some 200 million
people out of poverty since the start of economic transition3 while its income inequalities
are fast growing. There are three most noticeable types of income inequalities – regional,
within urban areas, and between urban areas and rural areas. Deng Xiaoping has said that
it is acceptable for some Chinese people to get rich first in the early years of economic
reform. He believes that some degree of inequality is functionally important in
stimulating competitive activities, which are necessary to economic growth and economic
growth.4 Following Deng’s theory, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) concern is to
reduce inequality to tolerable levels, but rather not to minimize it. However, the overall
pace of growing inequality is much faster than what the CCP has ever expected. For
example, the income gap between urban residents and rural residents has been out of the
acceptable range. A study by the Economic Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social
Science (CASS) shows the ratio of urban income to rural income has attained 3 to 1. The
1

World Bank, China: Macroeconomic Stability in a Decentralized Economy (Washington, D.C.: The
World Bank)
2
Wen Jiabao, “Zhengfu gongzuo baogao 2003” (Chinese Government Report of 2003), avaible at
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1024/2394441.html
3
Shujie Yao, “Economic Growth, Income Inequality and Poverty in China under Economic Reforms,” The
Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 35, No. 6, August 1999, p.127. (104-130)
4
Satya J. Gabriel, “Income Inequality in China’s Post-Great Leap Forward Era,” October 1998. It is
available at http://www.mtholyoke.educoursessgabrieleconomicschina-essays6.html
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ratio is as high as 6 to 1 if we include the non-currency income of the urban resident,
such as medical insurance, educational subsidies, and unemployment relief.5
The Gini coefficient is commonly used to evaluate the income inequality in a nation.6
China’s Gini coefficient in the late 1970’s was very low by international standards,
modest by comparison with most developing countries. After 1978 (the starting of
economic reform), income inequality rose substantially in both urban areas and in the
countryside, particularly in the countryside. For the period between 1978 and 1987, the
rural Gini increased by 8 percentage points whereas the urban Gini rose by only 4 points.
After 1987, income inequality in the cities grew at a faster rate than in the countryside
(See appendix-table 1).7
According to the World Bank’s report of “Sharing Rising incomes: Disparities in
China” in 1997, China’s Gini coefficient in the 1981 was 0.28 and rose to 0.38 in 1995.8
This number is slightly better than those numbers in Sahara African countries and in
Latin American countries. The report points out that there are no other countries, except
for China, experiencing such a sharp rise in income inequality in a short period of 15
years. The income gaps keep rising since China’s entry in World Trade Organization
(WTO). Some economists estimate that China’s Gini coefficient is 0.458, which is
beyond the universally acceptable warning number of 0.40.9

5

Zeyuan Yu, “Zhongguo chengxiang shouru chaju zuda” (Chinese Urban-Rural Income Inequality is the
highest in the World), available at http://www.zaobao.com/gj/zg007_260204.html The data are from an
recent investigation conducted by the Economic Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS)
6
The Gini coefficient is a widely-used measure of income dispersion. It ranges form 0 (no inequality) to 1
7
Chris Bramall, “The Quaility of China’s Household Income Surveys,” The China Quarterly, 2001, P. 692.
8
World Bank, “Sharing Rising Incomes: Disparities in China,” World Bank, Washington, D. C., 1997.
9
Wei Zhong, “How Severe is the Income Inequality in China,” Zhongguo Baodao Zhoukan (China’s
Report Weekly), see http://server36.dedicatedusa.com/~hostingd/html/ns00976.htm
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The income gaps are reflected by the statistic income disparities among the reform
winners and the reform losers, and so on. For example, in 1993, the State Industrial and
Commercial Bureau reported that there were 500 millionaires (the currency is yuan) in
China. In 1994, the State Council Development Research Center reported that there were
ten times more millionaires (yuan) than 1993. In 1995, People’s Daily Newspaper
(Renmin Ribao) reported that the number of millionaires (yuan) reached 1,000,000 people;
however, Chinese Industry and Commerce Newspaper (Zhongguo gongshang shibao)
claimed the number of millionaires (yuan ) was at least 3,000,000; According to “Forbes
Magazine” ranking, the 50 richest people in China had a collective net worth of 10 billion
dollars in 2000.10
In contrast, according to the data released by the State System Transition Office
(Guojia tizhi gaige bangongshi), the peasants’ annual income was 1924 yuan ($232) per
capita in the nine provinces of Hunan, Hubei, Anhui, Henan, Hebei, Sichuan,
Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaonin; the peasants’ annual income was 1464 yuan ($176) in
the six provinces of Shaanxi, Ningxia, Qinghai, Yunnan, Gansu, and Guizhou. That is to
say, the wealth of those 50 richest people equals the sum income of 50 million peasants;
the wealth of 3 million millionaires (yuan) is two times of the sum of the income of all
China’s 900 million peasants.11
Acute income inequality not only poses a moral problem in and of itself, it also
carries negative consequences for China’s political stability. China has recently
experienced more protests related to economic grievances than at any time since the
10

Xiaobo Liu, “China’s Robber Barons,” available at
http://iso.hrichina.org/download_repository/2/robberbarons.pdf, this article is translated by Stacy Mosher.
11
Ibid.
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period of “opening up and reform” began some twenty-five years ago. The number and
the size of political agitation have risen sharply. For instance, the number of collective
protests grew fourfold in the 1990s, increasing from 8,700 in 1993 to a frightening
32,000 in 1999.12
To be sure, the huge income gaps in China result from the transition to a market
economy. Scholars are widely concerned that economic reforms in China have intensified
income inequality in terms of generating winners and losers.13 This hypothesis has been
corroborated by the experiences of Western countries’ liberal economies and that of
Eastern European and Russia where the transition into a market economy induces rising
income inequality.14 This argument is also true in China’s transition to a market economy
in that economic reform has generated the rising income disparity between winners and
losers. 15 The reports and studies of Chinese income inequality are found in a large
amount of official Chinese reports, newspapers, academic investigations, and popular
magazines. These existing studies either engage broad explanations of why economic
reform in general has led to sharpening social inequality in general, or deal with the link
between a particular policy change (such as enterprise reform) and income inequality.

12

Minxin Pei, “China’s Governance Crisis,” Foreign Affairs, September/December 2002, Vol. 81, No. 5,
pp. 96-109.
13
Yehua Dennis Wei, Regional Development in China: State, Globalization, and inequality, London; New
York: Routledge, c2000.
14
Dijana Pleština, Regional development in Communist Yugoslavia: success, failure, and consequences,
Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.
15
Beverly Hooper, “’Real’ China in the 1990s,” The China Journal, No. 39 (Jan., 1998), pp. 83-91, and
Kai-yuen Tusi, “Trends and Inequalities of Rural Welfare in China: Evidence from Rural Households in
Guangdong and Sichuan,” Journal of Comparative Economics, 26, pp. 783-804 (1998).
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Most of these research works come to a unanimous conclusion that China’s transition to
market-oriented economy has caused the rising income inequality.16
I tend to accept the opinion that China’s increasingly market-oriented economic
system has aggravated social inequality to an increasingly extreme degree. However, the
increasing income inequalities in China are not just the natural consequences of marketoriented economic reform. China’s authoritarian political regime accounts for the uneven
distribution and redistribution among different social groups as well. For example, highranking government officials and the so-called “new rich” have captured a
disproportionate share of the benefits of economic reform; relatively speaking, most
ordinary workers and peasants have not fared so well. As the crucial power that controls
the redistribution of social wealth, the political and administrative elite significantly
influence (increase or decrease) the income gap between winners and losers that
accompanies economic reform. Being the nucleus of the political system, the CCP has
political control of government institutions, public organizations, and policy initiatives.
Decision-making is shared among a relatively small number of people who are senior
Party members, in addition to holding official state offices.
Departing from the perspectives of the existing articles, this thesis will focus on the
relationship between CCP’s authoritarian political regime and income inequality. I will
present the argument that China’s authoritarian political regime contributes to the rising
income inequalities in post-reform China. I will attempt to analyze the cause of income
inequality in China by elaborating the characteristics of the CCP’s authoritarian regime.

16

Yanjie Bian, John R. Logan, “Market Transition and the Persistence of Power: The Challenge
Stratification System in Urban China,” American Sociological Review, October 1996, Vo. 61, pp. 739-758.
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Authoritarianism means a national political regime is accountable to a powerful and rich
minority and tends to adopt public policies benefiting this minority.17 Leaders represent
the interest of the powerful elite and rich minority. My research hypothesis is that
political authoritarianism in China has worsened the income gaps. The theory I will apply
combines the common “pathology” of Communist Parties and Chinese traditional
ideologies of guanbenwei (officer centreness) and guanxi (inter-personal network). My
main argument is that political privileges granted to cadres are responsible for the
increasing income inequality in China. I elaborate the argument from three aspects: the
authoritarian nature of the Chinese political system; power abuse and political corruption;
Chinese social stratifications and the dual urban-rural system. Among the three aspects,
the CCP’s authoritarian political system is the leading cause for the widening income
inequality in reform-era China. The CCP’s authoritarian regime helps to generate the
officers’ power abuse, corruption, and unequal social stratifications (i.e. the unequal
treatment of cadres and workers in the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and the unequal
treatment of grass-root cadres and peasants). I also make a comparative study of the
former socialist regimes in Soviet Union and East European countries.
My analysis proceeds with introduction, literature review, analysis (including the
authoritarian nature of Chinese political system, power abuse and corruption, Chinese
social stratification), conclusions and implications (including a comparative study of the
post-Communist countries in the transitional period).

17

Rafael Reuveny and Quan Li, “Economic Openness, Democracy, and Income Inequality: An Empirical
Analysis,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 36, No. 5, June 2003, pp. 575-601.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

Rising income inequality is often considered a likely outcome of the transition to a
market economy in China. 18 Victor Nee presents the market transition theory, which
explore the impact of emerging market economies on social stratification; he claims that
market mechanisms have predictable implication from inequality. Nee’s theory exploits
the broad sense of market transition to explain rising social inequalities in China. Based
on Nee’s theory, some scholars have made relatively narrower linkage between some
specific economic factors and income gaps between specific groups, such as that between
coastal areas and hinterland areas, higher-educated and lower-educated workers, male
workers and female workers.

Kai-Yuan Tusi explores income inequality from the

perspective of geographical factors, particularly the coastal-interior income imbalance,
urban-rural income disparity, and so on. Shang-jin Wei makes this research more
concrete. He argues that bad conditions in hitherland China, such as inadequate
transportation, infrastructure, and communication technology, contribute to the rising
income inequality between costal areas and interior areas.19
Xiaogang Wu argues that education has a strong effect on personal income inequality
in urban China. People with higher education backgrounds earn much more than those

18

Kai-yuen Tusi, “Trends and Inequalities of Rural Welfare in China: Evidence from Rural Households in
Guangdong and Sichuan,” Journal of Comparative Economics, 26, pp. 783-804 (1998); Wu, Xiaogang,
“Work Units and Income Inequality: The Effect of Market Transition in Urban China”, Social Forces, Mar
2002, Vol. 80 Issue 3, p. 1069.
19
Shang-jin Wei, “Is Globalization good for the poor in China?” Finance & Development, September 2002,
Volume 39, Issue 3, p 26(4), Copyright 2002 International Monetary Fund.
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with lower education backgrounds. 20 Matthews and Nee argue that the unequal trade
system between city and countryside explains the rising income disparity between urban
residents and rural residents. The prices of manufactured goods have rapidly inflated
while the state purchasing prices for agricultural products are relatively stagnant, which
has decreased the peasants’ income, thus expanding the income gap between urban China
and rural China.21
J. Knight and L. Song suggest that the relaxation of the restrictions on rural-urban
migration has had a unintended negative impact on the income gaps between urban
residents and rural residents.22 Shujie Yao stresses that rural-urban migration has been
somewhat relaxed in the reform era, and millions of young and relatively more educated
peasants have migrated to the cities. However, the aftermath of this massive moving out
has left behind the old and less educated peasants to work on the farms. Moreover, the
household registration (hukou) system prevents rural migrants from taking formal urban
employment or obtaining subsidies (housing, pensions, health care, education, food, and
many others) that are solely available to the urban populace. “As a result, migrant
workers usually end up in low-paid and casual jobs, and many of them become the urban
poor.”23
There is no doubt that economic factors are important to explain the income gaps
among individuals from different educational backgrounds and different areas. Market
20

Xiaogang Wu, “Work Units and Income Inequality: The Effect of Market Transition in Urban China,”
Social Forces, March 2002, Volume 80, Issue 3, p 1069, 31p, a graphs.
21
Rebecca Matthews and Victor Nee, “Gender Inequality and Economic Growth in Rural China,” Social
Science Research 29, 2000, pp. 606-632. Available online at http://www.idealibrary.com.cn
22
J. Knight and Lina Song, “The Spatial Contribution to Income Inequality in Rural China,” Cambridge
Journal of Economics 17, 1993, pp. 195-213.
23
Shujie Yao, “Economic Development and Poverty Reduction in China over 20 Years of Reforms”,
Economic Development and Cultural Change, p. 454.
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economy is one of the factors of accounting for the income inequality in general in that
individuals are increasingly paid in accordance with their abilities in the market-oriented
economy. Different abilities determine the different income levels. However, this valid
point does not capture the key reasons for income inequality in China. It does not address
the role of class differences under the CCP regime with regard to the income inequality.
24

That is to say, income inequality is closely related to China’s political system and the

different opportunities generated by it. Jinglian Wu, the famous Chinese economist,
argues that unequal opportunity is an important source for illegal income and corruption.
For instance, rent-seeking occurs when cadres use political power to secure illegal
income. In the process of re-demarcation of public property, the cadres in power get
opportunities for graft by selling public property with an abnormally low price to those
who will bribe them.25
Many scholars explore the relationship between political regime and income
inequality. Their works are scattered in various articles or chapters in books. The existing
academic work focuses more on some specific aspects of the authoritarian Communist
Party to explain the income inequality, rather than providing a systematic research. The
information and argument in this thesis offer a more comprehensive view of this issue. I
hope my study will fill some gaps in this area.
Reuveny and Li research how different political regimes, authoritarian and
democratic impact on income inequality in general. They measure and compare many

24

Qinglian He, “Xiandaihua de xianjing – dangdai zhongguo de jingji shehui wenti” (The Trap in
Modernization – Contemporary China’s Economic and Social Problems), Jingri zhongguo Press, 1998, p.
57.
25
Jinglian Wu, “Zhongguo shouri chaju zhuyao laiyuan yu jihui bupingdeng (Income Inequality in China
Mainly Originate from Unequal Opportunities),” See http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/kuaixun/35462.htm
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different countries and find that democracy reduces income inequality.26 Applying their
cross-national research result to China, an authoritarian country, it is justified to reach the
conclusion that the CCP’s regime will not alleviate the income inequality in China.
However, it is not tenable to make the more extreme argument that the CCP’s
authoritarian has caused the income inequality in China.
Xin Meng argues that social security reforms implemented in China, together with a
dramatic increasing in unemployment in recent years, have radically aggravated the
income inequality in urban China. Xuegang Zhou finds that cadres who are close to the
political authority and professionals who are close to market transactions have more
significant improvement in their income.27 Shuntian Yao makes a linkage between the
existence of the privileged groups and the unequal incomes in China. “[T]hese privileged
group members, by utilizing their monopoly power, are able to seize almost all the wealth
created by the ordinary Chinese people.”28 Xiaowei Zang finds a positive relationship
between Communist Party membership and income: “cadres and managers in the stateowned sector have income advantage over other state workers.”29
Linxin Xu, Hongyi Li, and Heng-fu Zou study corruption and how it affects income
distribution and growth. They find that (1) corruption affects income distribution in an

26

Rafael Reuveny and Quan Li, “Economic Openness, Democracy, and Income Inequality: An Empirical
Analysis,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 36, No. 5, June 2003, pp. 575-601.
27
Xueguang Zhou, “Economic Transformation and Income Inequality in Urban China: Evidence from
Panel Data,” The American Journal of Sociology, Volume 105, No. 4, January 2000, pp. 1135-1174.
28
Shuntian Yao, “Privilege and Corruption: The Problem of China’s Socialist Market Economy,” American
Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 61, January 2002.
29
Xiaowei Zang, “Labor Market Segmentation and Income Inequality in Urban China,” The Sociological
Quarterly, Volume 43, No. 1, p. 39.
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inverted U-shaped way, (2) corruption alone also explains a large proportion of the Gini
differential across developing and industrial countries.30
Deyuan Zhang links peasants’ low income to the Communist political regime, which
generates unequal policies toward peasants. It is the unequal social distribution system
that has put the peasants at the bottom of Chinese society. The most apparent regime
disadv antages are embodied as the chengxiang eryuan jinji jiegou (different economic
systems between urban China and rural China) and chengxiang eryuan hujizhidu
(different citizenships between urban China and rural China).31 According to Shaoguang
Wang, the Chinese government’s weakness in public finances (aggravated by official
graft and corruption) significantly limits its ability to decrease the income gap.32 Wang
also notes that Chinese central-government revenues have averaged a very low 8 percent
or less of Gross Domestic Productivity (GDP) in recent years, hence undermining
China’s spending on social security projects. Moreover, official graft and corruption
drain out the limited government revenue which could otherwise provide economic
security to those laid-off SOE’s workers and peasants. Wang argues:

As figures for 2000 reveal, moreover, formal government revenues at all levels
equal only about 15 percent of GDP while so-called informal revenues kept
spiraling upward, and now probably total two-and-a-half times the amount of
formal revenues. No other countries in the world have seen so many public funds
go into off-budget accounts. Collected in the name of the state but subject to

30

Linxin Colin Xu, Hongyi Li, Heng-fu Zou, “Corruption, Income Distribution, and Growth,” Economics
and Politics, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2000. It is also available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstractid=236215
31
Deyuan Zhang, “Nongcun de renwen pinkun yu nongcui de zhidu ‘pinkun’” (The Cultural Poverty and
Regime Poverty in Rural China), see http://www.duoweinews.com/cgi-bin/newsfet
32
Shaoguang Wang, “China’s Changing of the Guard: the Problem of State Weakness,” Journal of
Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 1, January 2003, pp, 36-42.
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fewer controls than formal revenues, informal revenues furnish ample
opportunities for official graft and corruption.33

My focus in this thesis is to explore the nature of income inequality at the political
regime level, particularly in the Chinese Communist regime. I use national and regional
data reported by the National Bureau of Statistical Bureau of China (NBS), the Supreme
People’s Procuratorate of China (SPP), National Agricultural Department of China
(NAD), and so on. Equipped with statistical data and examples analysis, the work
enhances the general understanding of the CCP’s crucial part in shaping China’s income
inequality. There has been a chain reactions among the CCP’s authoritarian regime,
skewed power structure, corruption, and the income inequality. Simply put here (I give a
full explanation of this point later in the analyses part), the CCP’s unchallenged power of
the political and economic resources in Chinese society is the source of the skewed power
structures in China. They cadres represent the Party, thus having the absolute authorities
over the ordinary workers and peasants. In the process of redistributing the social wealth,
the cadres tend to abuse power for personal gain (the common way is “power for money”)
because effective forces are lacking to check their authority. The private entrepreneurs
(the Capitalists, actually) enter the elite class through bribing the cadres, i.e., “money for
power.” The alliance between the cadres and the Capitalists has made them the biggest
winners of China’s economy. In sharp contrast, the massive class of workers and peasants,
are excluded from the game of “power for money and money for power,” thus becoming
the disadvantaged groups. They are the biggest losers in the economic reform.

33

Ibid, p.40.
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CHAPTER III
ANALYSES

China is currently in the transitional period from a planned economy towards a
market economy. The nature of China’s economy is “bureaucratic Capitalism” led by the
authoritarian CCP regime. The goal of China’s reforms (including economic, political,
and legal reforms) is to provide economic growth while maintaining the Chinese oneparty state structure. 34 There is no obvious signal that the CCP is moving towards a
Western styled democratic society. The CCP authoritarian political regime maintains its
unchallenged power throughout the Chinese society.
The CCP plays the most important role in China’s economic reform. “China is not
wholeheartly embracing Western Style capitalism…It is a distinctively Chinese model, a
mixed economy in which the leadership is determined to keep the means of production in
the public sector.”35 The authoritarian regime has provided room for private business and
a market economy, but it still retains overall control of the economy. Essential segments
of the economy are either in government’s hands or the state has a powerful mechanism
for controlling them.36 On the one hand, China’s impressive economic achievements are
closely related to the CCP’s authoritarian regime. On the other hand, China’s dramatic
rising income inequality is also closely related to the CCP’s authoritarian regime.

34

D. Shlapentokh, “Post-Mao China: an alternative to ‘The end of history’?” Communist and PostCommunist Studies, 35 (2002), pp. 237-268.
35
Ibid., p.251.
36
Ibid., p.239.
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In the following analyses, I explore why the authoritarian CCP political regime
accounts for the widening income gaps in China in the reform era. My analysis proceeds
thus:
I focus first on is the nature of the Chinese political system in the reform era: the CCP
has absolute authority over the other political parties and over the three state branches of
legislative, executive and judicial; forces are lacking to check the CCP’s power; the CCP
cadres are the privileged group in China, who have authorities over the common Chinese
workers and peasants; the power is unequally distributed among the legislative, executive,
and judicial agencies. Second I look into the relationship between power abuse (including
corruption) and income inequality, resulting from bureaucratic system, guanbenwei, and
guanxi. Finally I examine Chinese social stratification from the political causes, i.e.,
unequal treatments between cadres and workers facing the SOEs’ reform; dual urbanrural system and the plight of the rural Chinese resulting from the official household
registration (hukou) system.

The Nature of Chinese Political System in the Reform Era

The CCP’s Dominant Position in Party-State China

The increasing income disparities among classes in China are embedded in the very
nature of the Chinese authoritarian political regime. The political regime controls the
allocation of political and administrative power, and has indirect but significant

14

influences on income redistribution policies (e.g. progressive taxation). A skewed
distribution of power will lead to a skewed income distribution and redistribution.
The ideology of the CCP was Marxism when it was first founded in 1921. The CCP
proclaimed itself a proletarian pioneer organization representing Chinese working class
and peasant class. With the founding of the PRC, the CCP has transformed from a
revolutionary Party to the ruling Party in China. Accordingly the mission of the CCP has
turned from overthrowing the old political regime to building and maintaining the new
social order in Chinese society. The CCP has borrowed the former Soviet Union style
(Leninist party structure) regarding the Communist party-state building, while inheriting
China’s traditional statist disposition. Consequently the CCP has set up an unchallenged
power and played the leading role in Chinese state affairs. Embracing Lenin’s thought
that the Communist Party is a vanguard but disregarding its being a mass-based political
organization, 37 the CCP openly emphasize its leading position in Chinese society but
actual disregarding the masses’ interest.
Assuming its absolute leading position, the CCP seeks great control over and
penetration of the overall society.38 The most important relationship in China is the one
between the CCP and Chinese government. The Party exercises constant supervision over
the work of the government, although there is a nominal (but not clear) demarcation line
between the Party work and the government agencies. As Deng Xiaoping said: “[T]he
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work of the government is to be carried out under the political leadership of the Party.
Strengthening government work means strengthening the Party’s leadership.”39
There is an absence of organizations outside the CCP system that can actually
supervise the CCP’s authority. The CCP is at the paramount position in Chinese society.
Although there are eight other political parties in the PRC, the CCP is the only political
party in power, whose legitimacy is assured by the Constitutional Law. The existence of
the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), which is composed of
the other eight political parties, only has have limited rights of participating in and
discussing the state’s policy-making. The CPPCC cannot veto the CCP’s policies, nor can
it have considerable influences on CCP’s policymaking. The power is highly
consolidated in the hands of a few elite CCP cadres or bureaucrats, who have authority in
important policymaking ranging from central government to local governments. Similarly,
the National People’s Congress (NPC), the so-called paramount legislative institute,
unconditionally complies with the CCP’s policy guide. The CPPCC and the NPC are
commonly referred to as “a piece of furniture” and “the rubber stamp”, respectively.
There also lack of effective organizations or regulations within the CCP system that
can limit the Party’s authority. The Party’s Central Commission for Inspecting Discipline
(CCID) deal with discipline and monitor abuses within the party. It is “to overcome the
problems of bureaucratism, bad work-style, opposition to agreed party policy, and the
rampant corruption that pervades the [P]arty.”40 The CCP has always prided itself on the
fact that it alone has righted the wrongs of the government. However, the CCID has
39
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become a system independent from the state’s judicial system with regard to the
punishment of the cadres’ (especially the high-ranking ones) who commit criminal
behaviors, particularly the corruption. In reality the CCID has replaced the prosecurators
to investigate the cadres, and has replaced the courts to try the cadres. This way the
cadres receive much less punishments from the CCID than that they should receive from
the courts.
There coexist two conflicting organizing principles – “democratic centralism” and
“first-hand responsibility” within the party. The introduction of “democratic centralism”
from the former Communist Soviet Union has consolidated and updated the CCP’s
authoritarian power over Chinese society. According to democratic centralism, all CCP
members have equal rights in policy making and personnel allocation. The individual is
subordinate to the organization; the minority is subordinate to the central committee. The
party expressly advocates “collective leadership” and forbid “all forms of personality
cult.”41
But in reality only few key persons have the ultimate power. Moreover, China has a
special regulation on ultimate decision-making power. It is referred to as the “first-hand”
responsibility. “First-hands” are those Party Secretaries who hold the highest-ranking in
state sectors (governmental agencies or SOEs). “First-hands” have the ultimate decisionmaking power on everything within their executive domain. “First-hand” regulation,
coupled with the characteristics of China’s economic transitional period, has inevitably
led the majority of the CCP cadres, particularly those “first-hands” to exchange private
interest with public power. This circumstance allows the cadres to use legal or illegal
41
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means to gain, extend, and protect monopoly positions, special treatment, and privilege.
Doing so inevitably leads to power abuse.
China’s political power is highly consolidated in and exercised by CCP high-ranking
cadres. The party enjoys absolute leadership over the central/local governmental agencies
(the administrative branch), courts (the judiciary branch), and national/local people’s
congress (the legislative branch). The CCP claims ideological correctness and a
disciplined grass-roots political organization. The Party policy is described as the “soul”
of these three systems.42 The Party promulgates various documents, such as conference
memorandums, policy guides (fangzhen), Party decisions (jueding), to all levels of
legislative, administrative, and judicial institutes. Nominally these documents are the
Party’s policymaking proposals, but in reality they are the paramount spirits that all the
three systems must carry out. Furthermore, the party-state characteristics determine the
overlapping of the bureaucratic elite and the political elite, both in the sense of personnel
allocation and power distribution. The distinction between “political” and “bureaucratic”
elite is blurred because both are paid by the state, and the government cadres often serve
in party posts as well. The state is not an independent and autonomous force, but rather
an instrument of the CCP.
The CCP is the unchallenged power dominating the Chinese society. By setting up
four-level government agencies (central, provincial, county, and township/villages), and
by setting up Party units within the government agencies, the CCP effectively assures its
full control of the government operation. Personnel placement and policy guidance are
42
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the two key roads through which the CCP can achieve its designated goals for the whole
Chinese society.43 Under such a political regime, the state is not an independent and
autonomous force, but rather an instrument of the CCP.44 This is also called China’s
party-state integration. This state power structure and power relations make the CCP’s
one-party regime more prone to stand on the behalf of the CCP and government cadres,
but neglect the interests of the workers and peasants. Emphasizing the role of the
vanguard in the Chinese society, the CCP’s policies focus more on the administrative
perspectives, rather than the civil serving perspectives. That is to say, the CCP is the
supervisor of the Chinese people. The small group of the CCP and government cadres
actually executes the CCP’s functions, thus having power and authority over the common
Chinese people. In this sense, the government enjoys enormous powers but accepts fewer
responsibilities.
It is true that the CCP has made some reform measures on China’s political system in
the reform era, such as the decentralization of power, direct election at the level of
township and village, and legal reform. 45 For example, the CCP and the central
government have given up some administrative power to the local governments. Some
scholars, accordingly, presume that CCP’s power has been significantly undermined. But
the new measures of decentralization have yielded limited results in improving the
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transparency of the whole bureaucratic system,46 nor have they substantively altered the
authoritarian characteristics of the CCP or led to any real democratic changes.47 The
CCP’s hegemonic position is left intact in the Chinese society; its ability to dominate
Chinese society has not been significantly undermined.48 As what Yang Zhong has put it:

[T]he decentralization has been a strategic move on the part of the central
government. Decentralization in post-Mao China is granted and directed by the
center to spur economic development; in other words, decentralization in China is
a process controlled from the above rather than a spontaneous or free flow process.
The center decides what to centralize and what to decentralize.49

The Official Cadre System

The leadership in China is characterized as the dang guan ganbu (the Party controls
the cadres) policy. This principle is equivalent to the former Soviet nomenklatura, a list
of positions or offices controlled by the various Party committees (cadres). The CCP
shows a sharp preference for allocating and promoting its members important positions
into bureaucratic.50 Political loyalty and conformity is an explicitly expressed criterion of
evaluating candidates for promotion. Therefore, the CCP assures its policies will be
carried out by the threes agencies of legislative, administrative, and judicial.
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The current cadre system in China is complicated, which includes CCP cadres,
administrative cadres, people’s organization cadres, military cadres, technical cadres, and
professional cadres. 51 Cadres are official government employees, working for and
representing the CCP, the Chinese government, the military organizations, and so on.
Among all these six categories of cadres, the CCP cadres and the administrative cadres
are more relative to my thesis topic. The term cadres I use in this thesis particularly refer
to those who hold positions in the CCP system and in government agencies.
The cadre system is a 15-grades hierarchical system.52 At the bottom of this system is
the network of some 3.51 million primary party organizations (jiceng dangzuzhi) based in
work-units, neighborhoods or in villages and where there are three or more full party
members. “Above this is a hierarchy of organization running upwards through the county
and provincial levels to the central bodes in Beijing.”53
The relations among different grades cadres are vertical. Authority is vested with
groups of elite minorities, who have absolute power over important policy making. The
party secretary of a province or city has too much influence over matters ranging from
personnel to policy. The high-ranking CCP cadres and the cadres in leadership position
are the actual policy makers in China. The low-ranking cadres and the cadres in nonleadership positions can have some degree of administrative or political privileges in
terms of which grade they are in. As what I have analyzed above, the organizing principle
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of “democratic centralism” is substituted for the administrative principle of “first hand.”
Therefore, the Party is undoubtedly undemocratic.54
There are clear differences among high-ranking cadres and low-ranking cadres. The
high-ranking cadres include the incumbent cadres at the level of the central
government/Central Party committers and the provincial government/provincial Party
committees. The low-ranking cadres include whose rankings are below the provincial
level, i.e. those who are at the level of county and township.
Ranking in the CCP official hierarchy is crucial. The higher-ranking officials have
higher privileges than the lower ranking ones. The lower-ranking government officials
are subordinate to the higher-ranking officials, whose promotions to the higher grades are
up to the higher-ranking ones, instead of the “children people.” Accordingly, the
supervising force is from the officials at the higher ranking, but rather than from the
bottom “children people”.
It determines not only political privileges, but also a variety of material perquisites.
Different rankings mean different privileges and treatments. The higher the ranking is,
the better the privilege, treatment, and more perquisites and the cadres will receive. For
example, province-level governors are accommodated cars of 450,000 yuan (around
$54,000); vice province-level governors will have cars of 350,000 yuan (around $
42,000); and the other lower rankings cadres will have cars of 250,000 yuan (around $
30,000).55
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The hierarchical status of cadre system makes the vertical relationships among
different-ranking cadres. The high-ranking cadres and the cadres in leadership positions
hold the most crucial positions, thus having the discretion of policymaking and personnel
assignment. That is to say, the promotion of the lower-ranking cadres is based on the
satisfaction from the higher-ranking cadres, but not on their performance evaluation from
the grass-roots masses (lao baixing). In a speech to high-ranking officials in the wake of
the suppression of the Democracy Wall Movement in late 1979, Deng Xiaoping made the
point that “cadre privilege is one reason why we are estranged from the masses...The
problem originated at the top, and officials below followed suit. It has also degraded the
behavioral modes of the society.”56
Since the promotions are in the hands of their superiors, the lower-ranking cadres are
only accountable for their supervisors, but rather for the masses. The CCP has become a
network of bureaucratic elites whose primary purpose is to satisfy their direct leaders,
either by maintaining solid personal relationships or by directly bribing. As Minxin Pei
writes: “in one survey, about two-thirds of the officials being trained at a municipal party
school said their promotion depended solely on the favors of their superiors; only five
percent thought their own efforts could advance their careers.”57 “Money for power” is a
common strategy among the lower-ranking cadres to please their supervisors.
Accordingly “power for money” is not something odd among the higher-ranking cadres.
The interest exchanges between power and money among vertical cadres are no longer
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individual behaviors, but have become a network. The ordinary Chinese people fondly
recall the days of Chairman Mao when the local officials were more disciplined.
During the reform era, the CCP has paid more attention to the economic development.
At the same time, the CCP has loosened its discipline on its members, and put its desire
for ideological correctness marginal position. The incentive of the lower-ranking cadres
to seek for the promotion to the higher ranking is primarily to get better privileges and
treatment, but rather than seeking for Communist ideological correctness or serving the
people.
Scholars such as Nee presumes that the market economy has naturally enhanced the
role of market in redistributing social wealth, thus undermine the administrative powers
of the cadres. However, this hypothesis is not compatible to the reality in China. The
truth is that the cadres’ privileges are not shrinking in the reform era. As Yang Zhong has
said:

Economic reforms in the last twenty years have had mixed impacts on the status
and privileges of the cadres in China. On the one hand, cadres have lost some of
the traditional privileges such as traveling on sleeper trains or airplanes, staying in
certain hotels, shopping in special shops or dinning in designated restaurants. On
the other hand, economic reforms and the transitional economy have opened
numerous opportunities for cadres to use their power to “rent” their office for
personal gains…official positions are linked to power, and power leads to
opportunities for material gains.58

Since rising inequality has made the two largest social groups – workers and peasants
– relatively worst-off, CCP’s traditional support from these two groups are eroding. To
ensure the party’s political monopoly, the CCP has started to recruit the new Capitalists
58

Yang Zhong, p. 94.

24

(such as the private entrepreneurs) to join in the Party in order to expand its social base.59
Jiang Zemin, China’s ex-President, permitted the registration of the private entrepreneurs
in 2001.

The Imbalanced Power Distribution among the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial
Agencies

In the party-state China, the CCP represents the state. The CCP effectively controls
state bureaucracy of administrative, legislative, and judicial through its allocation of CCP
cadres to these three systems. The legislative-administrative-judicial relations in China
are not based on a separation of powers, but rather a division of labor, particularly among
CCP’s members.60
Among the three systems, the administrative system is the most effective way for the
CCP to control the whole Chinese society. Therefore, the power distributions are
imbalanced among these three systems, i.e. the administrative power overmaneuvers the
other two. As government under CCP’s political system is believed to rest on the “rule of
virtue,” checks on and divisions of power are regarded as unnecessary.
The legislature cannot actually play the role of checking government’s executive
power. According to the Constitutional Law, governmental agencies should function as
the executive branches of and be accountable for the legislative agencies (People’s
Congresses). That is to say, all the policies carried out by the government must be either
59
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initiated or approved by the people’s congress at the same administrative level.
Governmental agencies are legally subject to legislative supervision. However, compared
to the administrative power, the legislative and judicial systems are weak in
contemporary China. When combined with pervasive inter-personal networks, the
disproportionate concentration of political power in the administrative sector produces
especially pernicious forms of power abuse. For example, it leads to the irregular use of
power by cadres, an important aspect of corruption in contemporary China known as
“unhealthy potential.”
The sense of law in China is weak. In pre-reform China, ignorance of law was
common among both party cadres and ordinary people, i.e. the party enjoyed absolute
leadership over the judiciary. Party policy was described as the “soul” of the legal system,
and thus had a status higher than law.61 This position began to be reversed in the reformera China. Deng Xiaoping held that “law was the highest authority.” But Deng was
ambivalent as well, because he had consistently rejected what was considered to be the
Western “bourgeois” notion of “the supremacy of law” under which the party would be
subordinate to law and under the supervision of the judiciary instead of vice versa.
Therefore, the phrase “leadership of the party” was inserted into the Preamble of the 1982
Constitution. It is a “legal” clause allowing for political manipulation,62 which means the
highest law of the land was formally subordinated to a political party, and China is
essentially ruled by a single party. In the absence of checks and balances to party rule, the
61
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legal system, including the legislative power and the judicial power, is not truly
independent, despite the proclamations of the Chinese government.
The realities of Chinese politics still permit law to play only a secondary role in the
governance of China.63 Many people think Chinese laws are “a piece of wastepaper”64
and that the weakness of China’s legal system is connected to overwhelming
administrative power in China. An Australian lawyer in Shanghai said she discarded her
copy of the Chinese legal code when it became clear local party officials were ignoring
national regulations. “No one seems to pay much attention to laws,” she said, “unless
they can figure out a way to make a profit from them.”65
Many factors are responsible for the power abuse by cadres but there is no denying
that the weakness of the legal system cannot be an effective way to check the rampant
administrative power.66 Chinese legal reform has begun to do nothing less than redefine
basic relationship between law and politics. It is clear that law has advanced beyond the
scope of political control to serve as a social regulator and a mechanism for effective
administration (economic and administrative law) since the Chinese government has
initiated political reforms, including legal reform. However, in many cases, “power”
outweighs “law” and public officials can even openly defy laws in post-Mao China.67
Although the positive change is that the current leadership advocates the replacement of
the “rule of man” by the “rule of law”, we have not witnessed some significant change of
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the relations between state and Party. There is no sign that CCP is planning to surrender
at least some of its authority to law. The transformation from “rule of man” to “rule of
law” is at the moment unclear.

Power Abuse, Political Corruption, and Income Inequality

Power abuse refers to the irregular use of regulatory power among the cadres and
public officials. Political corruption refers to actions of public officials that violate the
penal code and other statutes generally falling under the rubric of graft—including
embezzlement, misappropriation, malfeasance, privilege, extortion, and taking and giving
bribes.
Power abuse is an outcome of the increased authority of government administrative
power. The system of intense bureaucratic control over distribution, and the
concentration of power in individual hands lay the basis for the power abuse by officials.
So much control over so many resources makes it inevitable that officials would use their
positions to extract benefits from their local communities.
Similarly, corruption in China is not only a problem of political ethics but also a
reflection of its party-state institutional structures.68 A highly bureaucratized regime and
society is regarded as the source of corruption in Communist countries. The roots of
corrupt behavior lie in the politicization of bureaucracy. As Kempe Hope explains, “the
saliency political dominance over bureaucratic values created a style of administrative
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behavior that is highly politicized despite the formal acceptance of a career system of
administration based on a high degree of professionalism.” 69 Scholars who study
Communist economy and corruption argue that the socialist structure and power relations
make the socialist regime more prone to graft, and the reform policies easily trigger
corruption.70
The consequences of corruption are detrimental to income disparity. It spurs
inequality, and reduces the effectiveness of public administration and distorts public
expenditure decisions, channeling urgently need resources away from sectors such as
health and education to corruption-prone sector or personal enrichment. Some members
of the ruling elite convert their political power into economic gains, building and
profiting from patronage machines. Corruption increases wealth for the few at the
expense of society as a whole, leaving the poor suffering the harshest consequences.
The widening income disparities among Chinese have more to do with cheating and
political corruption than with honest effort in the free market. 71 The Capitalists have
typically made fortunes through collusion with dishonest bureaucrats or taken advantage
of market chaos to get away with illegal or immoral maneuvers.72 China’s reform process
since 1978 has unfortunately generated some unintended consequences including more
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and different types of corruption, among the most obvious the increasing visibility of
transactions between political power and personal gain.73
The linkage between corruption (and other illegal income) and overall income
inequality is not a just a suspect. Academic studies and anecdotal evidence indicate that
corruption has reached unprecedented levels. The Supreme Prosecutor of China reports it
has retrieved 2.58 billion yuan from 1998 – 1992; 22.92 billion yuan from 1993 – 1997;
34.77 billion yuan from 1998 – 2002.74 Official figures indicate that least 4,000 suspected
corrupt officials have fled China so far, taking with them more than 5 billion yuan (US$
600 million) in illicit money. 75 One academic study estimated that illegal income
contributed to a 30 percent increase in inequality during the 1980s.76 Some estimates
suggest that graft may cost the Chinese economy 4% of GDP.77

Bureaucratic system, guanbenwei (official-centerness), guanxin (inter-personal network)
and the Influences on Power Abuse

The Chinese bureaucratic system resembles the former Communist counties because
they share some common features, such as overly strict adherence to formal procedures.
The Chinese bureaucratic system is characterized by “pathological” features universally
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associated with the bureaucratic form of organization – excessive observation of formal
procedure, endless shifting of responsibility, and so on.
China’s traditional values, such as guanbenwei and guanxi, certainly bear upon
present forms of corruption. Persisting traditional values combine with the contemporary
Chinese bureaucratic system to produce forms of corruption that have become even more
refined and complex since the reform years.78
Guanbenwei is a traditional political ideology in Chinese society, which is just the
opposite of the ideology of “social contract” in Western democracy. It assures that
governmental officials have absolutely authority over the common people. Government
officials are often called “parent officials,” whereas the people are “children-people,” and
the former have the absolute authority to make decisions while the latter must obey to
them. As in the past, holding public office is a source of benefit not only for the cadre
him/herself, but also for all his/her relatives. A person close to public office could always
benefit from its authority. We find in Chinese sayings that “in books [i.e., as a scholarofficial] one will find houses of gold as well as beautiful girls,” and that “the door of the
yamen [i.e., the court] is widely open; one should not go in if he has reason but no
money.” In the mind of most people, therefore, official status and wealth are very close.
It is believed that the primary purpose for being a government official is to obtain wealth,
and that it is rare to find an official who is honest, fair, and upright in Chinese history.
This ideology persistently influences Chinese philosophy, values, and norms regardless
of the concrete institutions and patterns of society – imperial or socialist. The People’s
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Republican of China (PRC) is certainly not an exception. The guanbenwei ideology
inherently influences the CCP regime during its party-state building Chinese society,
particularly during the reform era. The Communist cadres resemble the traditional gentry
elite79 in terms of human relations and practical understandings, little has changed since
the Imperial era.80
In this sense, the public officers in China are always the “parent officials.” Currently,
China’s ruling elite is broadly defined as the CCP and government cadres (particularly,
the high-ranking cadres and those leadership cadres). The ordinary people who do not
hold public offices are always the “children people,” which currently refer to the massive
classes of workers and peasants in China.
Guanxi (inter-personal network) is another ideology that plays an important role in
indigenous Chinese society. It stresses on the establishment of intimate personal
relations.81 Inter-personal relations refer to an informal mode of social exchange ordered
by ties of kinship or friendship. Informal relations actually penetrate party and state
institutions and shape their very functioning. Networks of officials, family members, and
friends trading favors and payments are facts of life for both the ordinary citizen and the
elite.82
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Chinese society has the traditional emphasis on the informal relations between
patrons and clients and irregular use of regulatory power. Although informal relations
appear to be quite different from formal relations governed by prescribed bureaucratic
roles, these phenomena are not contradictory but interactive. In conventional political
science “bureaucracy” describes one among many political pathologies, others being
“sectarianism,” “careerism,” “formalism,” “excessive centralism,” and so on. In popular
understanding, “bureaucracy” is thought of as something inefficient, inflexible, and out of
touch with, and unable to solve problems in reality. 83 The paradox of the Chinese
bureaucratic system is that it combines “pathological” features commonly found in
bureaucratic forms of organization (such as overly strict adherence to formal procedures)
with specifically Chinese features, yielding “a remarkable coexistence of rigid,
bureaucratic structure with flexible, personalistic social relations.” 84 Faced with
frequently irresponsive and inflexible Chinese bureaucratic institutions, ordinary citizens
resort to informal relations with government officials in order to achieve the most
mundane goals, and government officials correspondingly have an incentive to
irregularly use their regulatory power.85
Guanxi is easily conflated with corruption and bribery, whose instances have
increased in the reform period, have produced increasing resentment by ordinary people,
and have become a target of sever campaigns by the Chinese central government anxious
to preserve its legitimacy. For instance, the experiences of Taiwan and post-socialist
Russia’s encountering with capitalism suggest that guanxi practice may decline in some
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social domains, but find new areas to flourish. As the domestic economy continues to
develop, a new class of Capitalists (wealthy private entrepreneurs and investors) emerge.
The encounter between guanxi and capitalism, combined with state redistributive power,
has led guanxi to a new stage.86

Power Abuse and Corruption in the Reform Era

Corruption is not only a social problem itself but also a factor that contributes to the
worsening income inequality.87 Cadres abusing power and new rich bribing cadres have
gradually make those people the new rich in China.88 According to the survey made by
Remin University Sociology Department in 1994, most Chinese people (3/4 of all the
interviewees) think that power abuse is the most important source for the rapidly
accumulating of wealth among cadres who commit the power abuse and the businessmen
who bribe the cadres. Holding power and be close to power are the two most effective
ways to get rich quickly.89
As the reforms are unfolded and widened, there have emerged many opportunities for
public officials to seek private gain by abusing the office power. Various forms of
corruption in China, such as bribing, embezzling, and selling public offices, involve
abuse of power by public officials. More significant, corruption is not only some
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dispersed cases among individual cadres, but also the universally existents. Because of
China’s openness to world markets, government revenues seized by corrupt officials are
instead spent on imported luxury cars, mansions and even long-term mistresses, or
squirreled away in foreign bank accounts. These behaviors deprive the state of revenues
that could otherwise go toward social insurance and other programs designed to take the
edge off social inequalities.
For example, corruption patterns in China now include both the auto-corruption type
and the transaction (bribery) type. The auto-corruption is typically found in non-market
systems, the rule of which type is “power for money”. It includes embezzlement,
misappropriation, malfeasance, privilege, and extortion; the transaction corruption is
more common in market systems, the rule of which type is “money for power.” It usually
refers to one gives bribes and the other accepts them. In acts of auto-corruption,
attainment of materials and monetary gains is not determined by the market but by power
and status. The power of office is what ultimately tips the balance. The transaction
corruption is characterized by an impersonal process whereby influence is accorded those
who can “pay” the most, regardless of who they are. The increasing official rent-seeking
form of corruption is a reflection of this development.
Since the reforms were initiated, the Chinese people have witnessed two waves of
corruption. First, as China began to transform its planned economy to a market-oriented
one in the late 1970s, “double track” pricing systems was enforced for production
materials. That meant the same material could have two prices, with that set by the
government lower than the market price. Some middlemen, taking advantage of the
loopholes in the pricing system, began to bribe the government officials in order to get
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the lower-priced commodities. Later they would sell the lower-price product at higher
prices to the common citizens who have to buy at a higher market price because they
need such products. This kind of corruption is called “official speculation” (guandao) in
China.
A new wave of corruption arrived in the 1990s when the PRC began to reform the
country’s capital markets and State Owned Enterprises (SOE). Since the reforms are still
in their initial development, a system of laws and regulations to restrict the corrupt
behavior is lacking. Some officials took bribes and then granted low-interest rate loans to
those who bribed them or embezzled public funds and then invested the money in real
estate, stocks or futures markets. Some SOE managers either deliberately underestimated
the value of State assets and then transferred them to members of personal cliques or
embezzled these assets. Some even transferred State property to their personal accounts
during the restructuring process, resulting in heavy losses of State assets.
To explore the roots of corruption, we should take into account of the causes of
ideological and organizational of corruption.
First, China’s cultural heritage certainly bears upon present forms of corruption.
Persisting traditional values, such as guanbenwei and guanxi, combine with the
contemporary Chinese bureaucratic system to produce forms of corruption that have
become even more refined and complex since the reform years. The public institutions in
China are regarded as party-led bureaucracies that primarily serve their own interests. In
accordance with deep-rooted guanbenwei principles and ignorance of individual interests,
officials performed as “parent officials” over their “children citizens.” In theory, the
benevolent paternalism practiced by the Chinese bureaucrats assures that no checks on
36

their political power are necessary. The CCP ruling elites attempt to abuse their power to
gain personal interests. Consequently the most obvious phenomenon on power abuse in
the reform era is the increasing transactions between power and personal gain. 90
Accordingly, the CCP and government cadres are regarded as self-serving rather than
“servant of the people.” For example, “in the eyes of many Chinese villagers, village
cadres have become merely tax and fee collectors and enforcers of unpopular
governmental policies (such as family planning).”91 The sale of government offices by
local CCP bureaucrats was unheard of in the 1980s but became widespread in the 1990s,
A 1998 survey of 2,000 provincial officials, conducted by the official antigraft agency,
found that 45 percent of respondents thought such practices were continuing unabated.92
Second, Overwhelming administrative powers and various government restrictions
are seen as the important sources of power abuse. The more extensive the government’s
control and intervention, the more opportunities the cadres have to commit irregularly
using of power in order to gain personal interests. Some government agencies, such as the
State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC), Price Bureau, and State
Property Administration, continue to grow and wield more power in contemporary China.
The centralized political system in China makes public officials less visible and
inadequately supervised, thus reducing the perceived probability that corrupt actions will
be discovered. The relatively opaque political system and the disproportionate power of
government agencies have not only increased the cadres’ opportunities to practice such
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behaviors as “rent-seeking,” bribery and so on,93 but also offer a convenient point of
entry for inter-personal networks to penetrate authoritative administrative sectors.94 For
example, The National Security Supervision Committee (NSSC) is the only official
institute that supervises and controls the stock and state security markets, thus having the
absolute authority. The officers of the NSSC are not allowed to use the information they
know to gain personal income. But they disclose the information to their relatives,
acquaintances, other cadres who hold important positions in other state departments (such
as bank managers), or even those who bribe them. By this way, there are quite a few
people who have gained a great amount of money in a short time.95
China’s transitional period as the broad social environment of corruption should also
been taken into account. The objectives of the reform regime are clear: to transform the
old economic system in order to achieve economic development and to maintain its
political authority. Therefore, there is lacking of genuine marketization and
democratization in China’s transitional period. Specifically, the CCP cadres still tightly
control power. Hierarchically structured power, together with various information
dependent on position, is naturally resulting in cadres’ power abuse. As Maurice Meisner
has said, “[w]ith no commercial middle class when markets were introduced, it was local
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party officials who acted as the entrepreneurs became rich as a result.”96 Chinese market
economy is not well nurtured in terms of the Party’s continuing controlling of the market
information in the transitional period. There still exist various government restrictions
and intervention in various economic fields. Administrative interventions and
manipulation still exists and play a crucial role, apparently or subtly.
The corrupted behaviors universally committed by the cadres are also due to their
relatively lower paid. Compared to the “new rich” in China, bureaucratic officials have
lower salaries but are closer to the levers of administrative and regulatory power.97 In the
context of pervasive inter-personal networks, weak legal and anti-corruption systems, and
the irregular use of power by cadres, there naturally emerge the phenomena of “power for
money” and “money for power”, the latter peculiar to states with a high degree of
centralized administrative power (such as the formerly existing socialist states of the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe). The cadres construct patron-client relationships with
businessmen to get illegal wealth. Moreover, low pay has led tens of thousands of cadres
to take advantage of their grip on administrative power to extract illegal wealth from
businessmen or to get involved in other enterprises while holding on to their political
positions. Using the advantages of their offices, they have set up businesses and exploited
their political contacts for maximum profit. 98 Therefore, rising income inequality has
contributed to corrupt practices more severe than those before the reform era. The
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Chinese phrases “sheng guan fa cai” (get promoted and then become rich) and “Zheng
quan duo li” (scrambling for power and then seeking privileges) reflect the close
relationship between power and fortune.
Due to the “first-hand responsibility,” the “first-hand” cadres have the absolute
authority in their administrative areas. Hence, they turn the public enterprises into their
private fiefdoms. The operational norm is the system of state, society, party and
bureaucratic reciprocities based on networks of favor, kinship, friendship and association.
As the reforms unfolded and widened, there have emerged new opportunities for
corruption (mainly in its economic forms). There are more opportunities for public
officials to seek private gain by abusing the power of office; more rampant informal
relationships combined with the government bureaucracy; and corruption spreading to
more of the public administrative agents, including anti-corruption agents.
Appendix 2 is about China’s Bribe Perception Indicator (CBI) from 1980 to 2001.99
At the beginning years (1980-1995) of economic reform, China’s CBI was 5.13, which
means China was a slightly corrupted state. The CBI rose up to 2.43, showing that China
was a severely corrupted state. The CBI in recent year tends to go down (3.5 in 2001),
which indicates the corruption situation in China has been alleviated to some degree.
However, the overall evaluation of China’s corruption is still serious. Appendix 3 offers
evidence of the degree of government corruption (at least of a particular kind) in China
relative to other countries. The overall purpose of the table is to convey the level of
transparency in a country’s financial markets, represented by the “O-Factor”. One of the
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elements that go into calculating a country’s “O-Factor” score is the extent of corruption
in its financial markets, represented quantitatively by the figure in Column “C”. Among
the many countries included in the index, China features the third-highest level of
corruption in its financial markets, registering a score of “62”.100

The Political Causes of Chinese Social Stratification

Chinese social stratification is not a fixed status, but rather a changing process. In the
phase of socialist society, Chinese people were divided into three broad strata by the CCP.
The order from top to bottom was: the CCP and government cadres; the workers; the
peasants. In the phase of transition, the four social strata are from the top to the bottom:
the CCP and government cadres; the private entrepreneurs; the middle class (including
the professionals and the intellectuals, and so on); the workers and peasants.101 There are
two phenomena needed a special attention. One is the unchanging social status of the
CCP and government cadres, who are always classified as the top stratum, however the
whole social stratification has changed. They are the privileged group and have relatively
more power over the workers and peasants. The other is the unchanging social status of
the peasants who are classified as the bottom of the Chinese social classes. Yongshun Cai
has argued:
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The long-term existence of the same privileged group of the CCP cadres in
Chinese society has led to widespread collusion among CCP members. As a result,
these privileged CCP cadres, by utilizing their monopoly power, are able to seize
almost all the wealth created by the ordinary Chinese people.102

The roots of the evolution of a society’s stratification are found both in “market
force” and in political force.103 The CCP has the determining influences on the whole
Chinese society, including its market economy, and its political force has more influences
than the market force with regard to the social stratification. Therefore, the political force
is the fundamental reason for explaining the evolution of Chinese social stratification.

Chinese Social Stratification Evolution

Chinese social stratification has changed since the reform era. The criterion of
classifying Chinese people before the reform era was different from that in the reform era.
The most obvious difference among Chinese people before the reform was privilege and
opportunities disparities, while the difference during the reform era is income disparity.
The CCP played a crucial role in the evolution of Chinese social stratification. It is
reflected both by the CCP’s creating the social stratification before the reform and by the
CCP’s changing the social stratification during the reform period.
Before the reform era, the CCP divided Chinese people into three different social
groups when building a socialist society. The CCP allocated the privileges and
opportunities to different groups of Chinese people. To be more specific, the CCP and
102

Shuntian Yao, “Privilege and Corruption: The Problems of China’s Socialist Market Economy,”
American Journal of Ecnomics and Sociology, Vol. 61, No.1, January 2002.
103
Peilin Li, “What is the Criterion of Social Stratification? (Qufen shehui jiecen de biaozhun shi
shenmo?),” available at http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/zhuanti/socclass/306376.htm

42

government cadres shared various privileges; workers enjoyed national welfares (stable,
secure income; socially provided housing, medical care and education; guaranteed
lifetime employment); but peasants, who were at the bottom of Chinese society, had no
right to claim privileges or social welfares. The major differences among those three
classes were whether they were endowed by privilege and opportunity and how many
their privileges and opportunities were.
Despite the privilege and opportunity disparities among cadres, workers and peasants,
the income disparities among these three strata were not so apparent in the pre-reform era.
It was mainly because the CCP had a rigid hierarchical salary system to minimize wage
differences between cadres and workers. The CCP also had an agricultural price system
in order to protect the peasants’ income in order to put the income differences between
agricultural labors and industrial labors in a reasonable range.104 Some scholars, therefore,
argued that the authoritarian regime actually reduced inequality.105
Therefore, the CCP’s authoritarian regime accounts for the emergence of the three
social strata (the CCP and government cadres, workers and peasants) with unequal
privileges and opportunities. However, the authoritarian CCP regime contributed to the
relative income equality among these three strata.
The CCP is responsible for the changing of Chinese social stratification, along with
the widening income inequality, in the reform era. 106 There are two most noticeable
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changes of social stratification. First, the differentiation and de-empowerment of the
working class, consequently, tens of millions of workers have fallen in poverty and
become the new proletarians. Second, there have emerged a tiny group of the extremely
rich entrepreneurs (new Capitalists). Those new Capitalists and the CCP and government
cadres consist of the two better-off strata in reform-era China. They have either political
power or economic advantages or both. The rising middle class includes those small
entrepreneurs and professionals. Workers and peasants are at the bottom of social
stratification. The first three groups of people are better-off classes. They account for
probably no more than 13 percent of the urban population, and about 5 percent of the
country as a whole.107 The toiling class is composed of the vast majority of the Chinese –
peasants in the backward hinterlands who still lack basic food and clothing and the
xiagang (shadowed unemployed) or the unemployed urban workers who live by tiny or
even no income. The population of the worst-off class is around 95 percent of the whole
Chinese population. As Robert Weil said, the "reform" period has resulted in the
reproletarianization of the working class and "refeudalization" of the peasantry, who are
subordinated to a reemerging capitalist class.108
The real impact of SOE reforms on the urban working population began in 1997,
dramatically altering the urban lives in terms of employment, social security and
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housing.109 The working class has turned from the middle stratun to the bottoms stratum.
Yanjie Bian reports the deterioting working class situation as:

[Working lass has become] wage labor in the private sector (12 millions as of
1998), unprotected labor in the state sector (70 million), layoff labor wandering in
search for a job (30 million), and deprived migrant peasant-labor (60 million)…
One vivid description is the “3-no” word of private-sector wage labor: no definite
working hours, no medical insurance, and no labor contract.110

The miserable condition of the ex-SOE workers and the peasants has been a salient
example of income inequality in reform-era China. Tens of millions lay-off workers have
lost jobs and social securities; hundreds of millions peasants’ living standards are
decreasing from the plunging crop prices.
In the last half-decade, around 50 million SOE toilers have been furloughed or laid
off, with little or no living allowance.111 Although the CCP claims that three are millions
of xiagang workers have been reemployed, there are more and more workers are laid off
every year. During the same period, peasant incomes have flatlined while school and
other rural public service fees have escalated. “Those unemployed SOE workers and
those land-poor peasants and landless migrants now face the end of all minimal welfare
guarantees and destitution.” 112 China's official income disparity surpasses that of
famously polarized India, Indonesia, Egypt, and Pakistan, according to the World Bank
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(whose SOE bankruptcy and buy-out prescriptions are partially responsible for
engendering the very conditions it decries).113 The miserable condition of the ex-SOE
workers, a salient example of income inequality in post-Mao China, cannot be pinned on
only the economic reform. The factors, such as unequal treatments between CCP cadres
and common workers, between urban residents and rural residents, have to take into
account.

Absence of Independent Workers’ Union and the Unequal Treatment of Cadres and
Workers Facing the SOEs’ Reform

The Chinese workers are not allowed to have their independent workers’ union, given
the existence of the official institute titled as Workers’ Council (gonghui). Before the
reform era, the workers played an active role in determining the level of these social
welfare bundles through the workers' councils. The workers' council was given powers to
influence the social welfare budget. Therefore, the workers could act collectively with
regard to policies that could affect their living standard. But one of the consequences of
the reforms has been a weakening of the powers of the workers' councils by shifting more
power to enterprise management to determine the size of the social welfare fund.114
Gonghui organizations function as logistic department in the SOEs, such as affording
free worker uniforms, daily consumer goods like shampoo and soap. Gonghui

113

Tim Pringle, “The Path of Globalisation: Implications for Chinese Workers,” Asian Labor Update 41,
October-December 2001.
114
Satya J. Gabriel, “Income Inequality in China’s Post-Great Leap Forward Era,” available at
http://www.mtholyoke.educoursessgabrieleconomicsChina-essays6.html

46

organizations do not have the power to check the managers or “first-hands” regarding
decision-making or personnel arrangement, nor do they have the ability to protect worker
duly interest in the process of workers’ being laid off. Lacking of the independent
Workers’ Union to represent the workers’ interests, the SOEs’ workers are treated
unequally comparing the cadres in the processes of SOE reform. 115 The common workers
are the toilers, and are the first candidates to be laid off during the process of SOE reform.
In contrast, cadres are the middle-level or high-level mangers or leaders, and are less like
to be laid off unless a factory goes bankrupt or reduces the size of its staff drastically.116
Since the 1990s, the Chinese government has carried out an unprecedented reform of
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) involving the retrenchment of millions of workers. The
official count of laid off workers increased from 3 million in 1993 to 17.24 million in
1998. 117 But the unemployment insurance system is not adequate. 118 Job loss and a
reduced income have seriously disadvantaged a significant number of workers.119
To solve the reemployment of laid-off SOEs’ workers, the CCP’s leaders publicly
claim the significance of the private sector in providing employment for workers pushed
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aside by the state sector.120 But even though both Premier Zhu Rongji and Minister of
Labor and Social Security Zhang Zuoji have repeatedly announced that the various nonstate firms should be the engines that churn out ample job opportunities, much of the
working class formerly employed in the SOE’s has landed on the streets. 121 This is
principally because there is a mismatch between the demands of the private sector labor
market and middle-aged, under-educated, and unskilled status of the ex-SOE
workforce.122 The inability of most former SOE workers to find new employment in the
private sector would not be so traumatic for them if China featured a functioning,
national-scale social insurance system. Even though China nominally has such a system
in place, according to the State Planning Commission in 1999 thee are only a scant 2.89
percent of China’s laid-off participated in the system.123
Moreover, almost all aspects of the old social security system have been gradually
dismantled. Social welfare was reduced at the workplace and increasingly relied on
market forces and family self-support. For instance, medial care changed from fully statecovered medial service to a two-tire system, in which the state covers a certain
percentage of the costs and individuals pay the rest.124
In contrast to the plight of the laid-off SOEs’ workers, the cadres have accumulated a
large amount of illegal income from the SOEs. With unchallenged power in the SOEs,
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the cadres find that the Party has always been the most convenient way for them to amass
wealth and power. This phenomenon has become even more pronounced in the post-Mao
era, as cadres use their connections to open companies or assume important positions at
SOEs.125 To support the SOEs, the central government started to lend outrageous sums of
capital to SOEs in the 1990s, despite the fact that many companies were defaulting on
their loans.126 Party cadres are quick to take advantage of their positions and cash in on
China’s newfound wealth. In many cases, the cadres in leadership in SOEs have illegally
accumulated great amount money for themselves, but leaving the SOEs in bad shape.
There is a saying in China to depict this situation – “the temples are poor, but the
presiders are rich”. This means that the SOEs are poor, but the leaders are rich. Some
scholars estimate that the accumulated loss of SOEs’ treasure has reached or even more
than 600 billion yuan ($72.3 billion) since the 1980s. It shows the speed of the loss of
SOEs’ treasure is 50 billion yuan ($6 billion) every year.127
The resources that are potentially ameliorative the workers’ bad situations (such as
social security) have been drained off by the unprecedented level of corruption in the
CCP. The plight of the laid-off workers can also be traced to corrupt factory managers
who illegally privatize the SOEs in order to strip their assets, or steal the social insurance
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funds disbursed by the central government.128 This illicit behavior highlights the fact that
both SOE restructuring and managerial corruption are inseparable aspects of the CCP’s
political regime. In many cases, SOE managers have embezzled pension funds that laidoff workers counted on for a dreary subsistence.129 In other cases, managers have refused
to pay the severance wages owed to unemployed SOE workers when they are “buy-out”
(maiduan) their job positions.130 The maiduan policy refers that the SOE pay the workers
some money (the amount equals to their 3-or-5-years wages), and the workers give up
their job positions and give up the rights of claiming the social security welfares, such as
pension, medical insurance. Maiduan is an unfair policy to workers, especially those aged
and less-educated workers who have served many years in the SOEs. They are not
competitive enough to find new jobs. By the end of 2000, the tally for wage arrears in
Liaoning and Heilongjiang combined was an estimated $1 billion.131

Dual Urban-Rural System and the Plight of the Rural Chinese

There always exists the dual urban-rural system in China since the founding of the
PRC. This system is the source of the discriminative treatments between urban Chinese
and rural Chinese. The state resources are channeled primarily from the rural areas to the
cities, that is, the rural surpluses were transferred to urban industry, the military and other
state priority projects. The pubic resources are distributed quite equally among urban
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residents, especially in the pre-reform era. In contrast, the peasants are excluded from the
equal treatments with the urban residents.
The dual rural-urban system is solidified by the household registration (hukou)
system that ensures urban residents have relative more rights than the peasants, such as
medical care, pension, free or low-price housing, compulsory education, and so on. The
hukou system is the division that distinguishes urban Chinese from rural Chinese, and
ensures that the urban dwellers enjoy relative privileges over their rural cousins. There
are only two types of hukou – urban hukou (urban household registration) held by urban
residents which include cadres, and capitalists, SOEs’ tenured workers; rural hukou (rural
household registration) held by rural residents, which are mainly peasants. There are one
third of the population of 1.3 billion have urban hukou. Rural hukou holders are mainly
peasants living in the countryside or peasant-workers temporarily living in the cities, who
are excluded from urban citizenship. They are the majority (two thirds) of the Chinese
population. Urban hukou holders benefit from the comprehensive “labor insurance”,
providing disability and old-age pensions, maternity and sickness benefits, medical care,
and (since 1986) unemployment benefits as well.132 In contrast, rural hukou holders are
excluded from the social security policies.
The key feature of hukou system is that who is treated as a ‘citizen” – that is, able to
enjoy equal rights before the law and to participate in equal competition. All Chinese are
born with a type of hukou based on their parents’ hukou types.133 That is to say, the
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children of urban dwellers will automatically have the urban hukou, hence having the
comprehensive social benefits; the children of peasants will automatically have the rural
hukou, thus being excluded from all kinds of social welfares. Hukou is something kept for
a person’s whole life. It is not easy for the peasants to promote to the urban hukou.
Besides excluding the peasants from social welfare, hukou system creates more
unequal treatments between urban Chinese and rural Chinese. For instance, the CCP
adopts dual tax systems in rural China and in urban China. The rate of tax imposed on
rural residents is higher than that on the urban residents. For instance, the starting tax
income level is 800 yuan per month in urban China, while the agriculture tax is fixed to
peasants whatever they have or have no income at all. That is because the agricultural tax
is based on heads, rather than on income.134 In 2000, the per capita rural income was
2253 yuan (188 yuan per month), which meant the starting tax income level was 188
yuan per month in rural China in 2000. The total tax rate on peasants is as high as 8.4
percent. 135 The effective tax rate in 1996 for the agrarian sector (excluding village
enterprises) was estimated at 50 percent.
In reform era, groups of Chinese peasants are journeying from their natal villages to
townships and cities. The recent report by the National Agricultural Department shows
that there are current 150 million redundant agrarian labors in China, and the number is
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increasing at a pace of 6 million every year.136 There should be an effective way for these
redundant agrarian labors to transfer to other areas. But the existence of the dual ruralurban system has been barring rural dwellers from moving into the cities. Although China
has gradually relaxed restrictions on mobility for unskilled labor in the cities, indirect
obstacles remain, including a lack of affordable housing, exclusion from urban welfare
provisions, and high fees for work and residence permits. Moreover, the Chinese
government has explicitly expressed that the modification or abolishment of hukou
system is not on the legend in the 10th NPC.
The power of the gross-root cadres is mainly from the appointment of their superior
CCP’s cadres, both in the pre-reform era and in the reform era. Cadres also claim that
they represent the Party’s policies, thus preventing the peasants from questioning their
authorities.
In the pre-reform rural, the cadres were able to control almost all resources in the
rural economy. For example, all the rural land belongs to rural collective communities.
The cadres represented the communities to control the land, thus controlling the massive
peasants who relied on the land. When combining the rigid hukou system, the peasants
could not have the alternative choice to circumvent the cadres’ control because they were
not allowed to move to other rural communities or to the cities. Therefore, the peasants
were left no other choice but to subject them to cadre power. “Under the totalitarian
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rulership of the CCP [in the pre-reform era], personal resistance to cadre power or to
ideological mobilization was virtually impossible.” 137
In the reform era, the cadres’ monopoly over resources has been undermined
significantly along with a series of de-collectivization reform measures, such as the
distribution of land to the peasants. However, this does not mean the fundamental change
regarding the unequal cadre-peasant relationship. Jean Oi has proposed that the cadres’
economic role in the rural China in reform era is the main root of both corruption and
their legal power and privileges. 138 The rural economic system has adopted marketeconomy regulation but the rural political system remains unreformed. This has created
new opportunities for patronage and corruption, “altering, but not diminish, the power
and privilege of officials who deal regularly with ordinary citizens.”139 Yun-xiang Yan’s
survey shows that in 1990, most peasant households spent nearly 20 percent of their
annual incomes to bribe the corrupt village cadres.140
In recently years, there are some non-official charitable resources to support the
peasant families who cannot afford their children’s education fee. However, in conditions
lacking any transparency or supervision, this leads to embezzlement and corruption. The
more closely the charity is linked to the government, the better any irregularity is covered
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up. The same is true of poverty assistance where, for many years, funds were taken from
poor peasants into the pockets of local authorities.
Worsening economic conditions in rural areas have been exacerbated by
government’s indifference of peasants’ interests.141 The CCP prioritizes the economic
growth, but neglect the protection of peasants’ interests. In reform era, the peasants’
plight is more severe. “[P]easant incomes have flatlined while school and other rural
public service fees have escalated.”142 It is not that reforms of the past two decades have
destroyed China’s compulsory schooling system. On the contrary, the Chinese state has
never fulfilled its duty to provide education for peasants.143
The government does not provide essential services, such as public safety, education,
basic health care, environmental protection, and law enforcement in rural area. The
publicly visible collapses are medical care and rural education. Peasants cannot afford the
medical treatment and educational fee According to the 1998 survey conducted by the
Ministry of Health, 37 percent of sick peasants did not seek medical treatment because
they could not afford it, and 65 percent of sick peasants needing hospitalization were not
admitted because they could not pay. 144 Poor health has become the chief cause of
poverty in rural China. There were 40-50% of peasants below the poverty line in 2000,
and the reason was they got serious diseases but cannot afford the medical fee.145
Qiang Li’s survey in 2000 in Beijing shows that the peasant workers are excluded
from the urban social welfare. There are 33.5% of the peasant workers have experienced
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employment. More than 30% of the unemployed peasant workers have been in the status
of unemployment for at least half a year. None of the unemployed peasant workers have
ever received any sort of financial help from the Beijing government; instead they
struggle to make a living on their savings during the unemployment period. Facing the
unemployment, only 14.6% of the peasant workers will choose to come back to rural area.
Facing the disease, 59.3% of the peasant workers will turn to medical treatment because
they cannot afford. The other 40.4% of the peasant worker will see a doctor. The average
fee they spend is 885.45 yuan, but their employer only reimburse them 72.3 yuan, which
is less that one-twelfth of the actual medical fee. This means the peasant workers cannot
benefit from the public-health securities.146 In a recently published book of “Investigation
in Rural China” (zhongguo nongcun diaocha), the two authors reported that “since many
peasants cannot afford the medicine, they can do nothing but waiting for recovering
themselves. If it is a severe or a fateful disease, the peasants have to face death without
medical treatments”147
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Conclusions

There is no doubt the China’s GDP grows at a high speed since its economic reform.
However, high GDP speed does not mean the people’s satisfactory of economic reform,
nor dose it sufficiently means the improving of material conditions of life. On the
contrary, according to the two authors of “Chinese Peasant Investigation” – Chen Guidi
and Chuntao, a considerate amount of peasants in the province of Anhui complain that
their life standard is noticeably decreasing since the 1990s.
As the income inequality is growing sharply, social discontent is also growing. A
recent survey (results shown in appendix-table 3) indicates rising levels of popular
dissatisfaction with the outcomes of the CCP’s economic reform policies. Compared with
1987, overall satisfaction with reform declined in 1999. Public opinion concerning
economic reform was mixed, with respondents showing more pessimism in some areas
than in others. In two key areas, the provision of job opportunities and the provision of
incomes, people felt worse off in 1999 than they did more than one decade earlier. This in
part reflects the urban unemployment and decreasing income opportunities that resulted
from the streamlining of the SOEs. One might conclude that the increased degree of
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popular dissatisfaction with the results of market reform is related to the underlying
reality of increasing income differentials and other types of social inequality.148
Rising income disparities experienced by tens of millions of peasants in rural areas
and unemployed workers in the cities has led to rising discontent. In recent years this
social frustration has translated into political protests and riots against CCP authorities.
Consequently relations between the party-state and society are growing tenser along with
the rising income inequality. The number of reported worker and peasant protests is
arising at a startling pace. According to the Chinese Ministry of Public Security (a state
entity usually inclined to downplaying the extent of social unrest), the year 2002
constituted a high-water mark for worker and peasant demonstrations. 149 Whereas an
average of 80 daily "incidents" occurred in 2001, by December 2002 this figure had
swelled to 700.150
Recent surveys have found that inequality has become on the top three concerns for
the public (the other two are corruption and unemployment respectively). The challenges
that the CCP faces in the economic and social fields are vast. It should make effective
policies not only to accelerate the economic development but also to diminish the
worsening social inequalities and social discontent. In other words, the CCP needs
effective political reform to limit the effects of corruption, and to shelter an army of laid-
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off urban worker and the rural peasants with a genuine, functioning national-scale social
insurance program.151
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a scholarly analysis of the political causes of
increasing income inequality in the reform-era China. My analysis is on the CCP’s
regime structure, which has largely shaped the course of income inequality in China in
the last two decades. I analyze that the CCP’s skewed power structure accounts for the
widening income inequalities in China. I do not intend to exclude the other variables,
such as economic transition, that have influence on the income inequality in China. I
accept the opinion that in general market economy accounts for the income inequality.
But the causes of income inequalities are more related to the authoritarian regimes in the
transitional countries, such as China, Russia, and those former Socialist countries in East
European countries. That is, income inequalities in those transitional countries do tend to
upswing when authoritarian regime combines immature market economy.
Focusing on China, I show that China’s income inequality is linked to the Communist
authoritarian regime. The structure of power distribution originates from the ideology of
the ruling political party – CCP. The CCP has inherited the power distribution from the
former Soviet Union, while coherently carrying on such Chinese traditional ideologies as
guanbeiwen (officer-centreness) and guanxi (inter-personal relations), in the process of
state building.
The part of analyst includes: first, the nature of Chinese political system, which
includes: the CCP’s dominant position in party-state China; the cadre system; the

151

Yi-chong Xu, 2000, “State- assets Depletion and Economic Reform in China,” Studies in Comparative
International Development, Spring 2000, Vol. 35, No. 1, p. 73.

59

imbalanced power distribution among the legislative, executive, and judicial agencies.
Second, the relationship between power abuse (including corruption) and income
inequality, which includes: bureaucratic system, guanbenwei, guanxi, and the influences
on power abuse; power abuse and corruption in the reform era. Third, the political causes
of Chinese social stratification, which includes: Chinese social stratification evolution;
absence of workers’ union and the unequal treatment of cadres and workers when facing
the SOEs’ reform; dual urban-rural system and the plight of the rural Chinese.
Although China’s economy and society become more open and more adaptable to
world economy games, its political and administrative institutions lag ever farther behind.
Income inequality is not only a problem generated by market economy, but also closely
related to China’s authoritarian regime. Therefore, China need adopt deeper political
reform to attenuate the widening income gaps, such as adopting measures on cadre’s
system, substituting “rule of law” of “rule by man”, limiting the effects of corruption, and
sheltering an army of laid-off urban worker with a genuine, functioning national-scale
social insurance program.152

Implications

The post-Communist countries (PCCs) had economic and political structures similar
to those of post-1949 China: the command economic system and the imbalance of powers
generally existing in the former Communist regimes. Therefore, despite the many
152
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idiosyncrasies existing in China, there are some similarities in patterns of official
deviance, including skewed power structure, power abuse, and corruption, shared by the
former Communist regimes. After the collapse of Communist regimes, Russia and those
East European countries are in the transitional process of moving from the authoritarian
societies with highly planned economy to the civil societies with market-oriented
economy. Their transitional processes share something in common with China: negative
influences (corruption, graft, and so on) from the old Communist authoritarian regimes
affect the process of marketization. This has generated sever income inequalities, a
salient characteristic of the transitional society. For example, the former public officials
under the new regimes have become the new riches in the transitional period. To be more
specifically, the high-ranking CCP cadres and cadres in leadership in China have become
extremely rich in the reform era in China (e.g. during the process of the SOE reform).
Similarly, the ex-Communist Party members in Russia have accumulated a lot of money
in the process of privatization.
Social stratification is quite apparent in post-Communist societies. There is an
impoverished class, consisting particularly of those who live in the countryside, and an
upper class that includes the ex-nomenklatura and the directors of enterprises. 153 In
Russia, the income ratio between the wealthiest 10% of the population and the poorest
10% was about 4:1 in 1990, 15:1 in 1994, and 13:1 in 1996.
Income inequality in the post-Communist transitional society is often seen as a
function of changing political economy, particularly the transition from state socialism to
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a market economy. Such an assumption is not wrong, because the free market economy,
based on competition process, will engender both reform winners and losers.
Consequently, the income differences between winners and losers will been widen. But
the statistics of the new riches in those post-Communist sates indicate that political
factors, such as the old authoritarian regimes, have played a more noticeable role than
free market competition in explaining the income inequalities. The formation of the rules
of the new economy has inevitably been affected by the old political regime and old
economy.

The Coming Back of Ex-Nomenklatura

Although the governing styles in the post-Communist countries have changed
significantly since the communism’s demise, the political personnel have not changed so
much. “The faces atop and within the state apparatus of Romania, Belarus, or Ukraine are,
after all, not that different from those who had ruled in the 1980s.”154
Compared to the absolute power and privileges enjoyed by the ex-nomenklaturas, the
power and privileges of the new officials are not necessarily decline, and it may even
increase. The new forms of power, emerging from transitional economy, allow officials
to retain or expand their advantages. Subsequently, the ex-nomenklaturas under new
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regime enter the new economic elite.155 As Frydman, Murphy, and Papacaynski have
reported:

80% of the new Romania millionaires were part of the Ceausescu-era
nomenklatura; many had been in the arms industry and have since built their
fortunes on arms trading… [In Russia] 61% of the country’s new rich were
members of the ex-nomenklatura… [In Poland] over half of them (former top
nomenklatura) turned up as top private sector executives. The numbers in
Hungary are reported to be even higher than in Poland.156

“Multiparty politics was not industrialized in Russia until 1991. This means that the
most important role in politics has had to be played by informal networks.”157 The former
ruling elites play a decisive role in shaping the path towards the market economy. The
social inequality, inherited form the past, has been changed and deepened by the
monopolistic power of the former ruling elite.158
Under the old regime, the nomenklatura had privileges and controlled the nation’s
economic assets. Under the new regime, the nomenklatura gained title of the assets
through the process of privatization, and became the property holder of these former state
assets.159 In many transitional countries, there are many valuable assets to be appropriated
by those ex-nomenklaturas, who have enough power to lay their hands on them. Not only
the corrupt new public officials (new authorities, particularly) who gained enormous
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personal wealth, but also the people who have connections to those new authorities gain a
lot of money. The privatization has made the former Communist cadres extremely rich.
“The old nomenklatura has, indeed, muted into the new capitalist class.”160

Private Entrepreneurs – Public Officials Connections during the Privatization Process

The collapse of Communism has left a bulk of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the
few hands of the public officials (the former Communist nomenklatura, actually). The
new regime initiated the process of privatization, that is, to transform the centrally
planned economies into market ones. The problem of how to privatize the SOEs is that
“the stock of private savings is far too small to purchase the assets of he industrial sector
at prices that reflect expected profitability.”161 For example, it was calculated that at prereform saving rates it would take more than 100 years for he government to see the assets
of the Czechoslovak industrial sector.162
The Soviet tradition of personal networks have survived the collapse of the
Communism, and continued playing an important role in the process of privatization. In
fact, corruption together with patron-client relations has become a social character in
contemporary Russia, where the ex-nomenklaturas, i.e. the new public officers, dominate
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both economic and political systems. 163 The most widely discussed subject is the
‘oligarchic power’ of a small number of businessmen with ‘special relation’ within the
government and presidential administration.164
While officials turn their control of SOEs and public resources into private wealth,
those who in power and those who close to power benefit most. Political conspiracy and
ideological dishonesty are merely by-products of the transitional economies. Those who
are relatives or friends of the officials get the biggest Russia extremely valuable SOEs,
such as oil companies, for very low prices and falsified tenders.165 The commonly used
measures include auction, voucher, and so on. In the auction of the SOEs, entrepreneurs
who have close connections with the officials become the owner of the big SOEs buy
bidding significantly lower price than those who do not have a good connection with the
officials. Moreover, connection enables few entrepreneurs gain shares of the SOEs
simply through voucher in Russian and Czech.166
For instance, the private enterprises extracted nearly 30 percent of GDP in credits
from the Russian government in 1992-1993. “In consequence, the private enterprises pay
an inflation tax on their existing money holdings, but since they hold half the money
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stock, their net gain was nearly 15 percent of GDP. The household sector, and in
particular pensioner, lost an equivalent amount.”167
Waves of Power abuse and corruption are pervasive in all these transitional
societies.168 The former Communist state’s properties, such as industrial factories, have
been converted into private properties. There have emerged many forms of illicit
privatization of the economy. The transitional societies create conditions that are
convenient for pervasive existence of corruption among the former public officials.169
The diverse forms include “theft, unlawful profit, corruption, illicit pressure on the
legislature and executive bodies.” 170 “In a survey, Russians attribute ‘success in life’
more to ‘dishonesty’ (76%) and ‘connections’ (88%) than to ‘hard work’ (39%). Only
14% mentioned ‘education’ as a factor in becoming successful.”171
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